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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE AcTION-IMPOSING CRIMINAL PENALTIES To 
ENFORCE PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION-Defendants, Negroes, entered a section 
of a private restaurant designated to be for "White" patrons only. Although 
they were denied service, they refused to comply with the proprietor's re-
quest to leave. Defendants were subsequently arrested by a police officer 
after declining his offer not to arrest if they would depart, and were tried 
for violation of the state's criminal trespass statutes.1 They were found 
guilty of a misdemeanor. On appeal, held, sustained. Defendants have no 
constitutionally protected right not to be discriminated against by an oper-
ator of a private enterprise. State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E. (2d) 295 
(1958). 
l N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §§14-126 and 14-134. 
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The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the constitutional pro-
hibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment2 to limit invasions of civil liberties 
by state agencies only and not to restrain private individuals.3 A person 
seeking protection under the Constitution must establish an infringement 
of his rights by the state itself, and the protection to be afforded is thus de-
pendent to a large extent upon the bounds of the concept of "state action."4 
Before prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are invoked a court must 
determine (I) that there exists governmental action in fact, (2) that this 
action directly results in the denial of some recognized right of an individ-
ual, and (3) that the necessity of protecting such right outweighs a curtail-
ment of the state agency's freedom of action.5 In the principal case alterna-
tive grounds might be asserted to justify constitutional protection for de-
fendants. The state's issuance of an operating license to the restaurant 
constitutes state action in fact. While the recipient of the license will not 
necessarily employ discriminatory practices, the inevitability that this will 
result in certain sections of the country might suffice to provide the necessary 
causal relation between the state action and any subsequent infringement 
of individual liberties. The courts have not, however, adopted such a pierc-
ing analysis. Generally, a causal relation will be found only in cases where 
the state agency has expressly authorized discriminatory results.6 Neverthe-
less, in some instances the courts have succeeded in affording protection from 
discrimination by holding ostensibly private agencies to be instrumentalities 
of the state where they have received substantial state assistance7 or have 
performed functions of great public interest.8 In certain cases involving 
grave social or political implications extension of the instrumentality con-
cept has been applied.9 When less fundamental rights are involved the 
periphery of this approach has remained uncertain,10 and has never been 
2 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST., 
Amend. XIV. 
3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
4 See 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956). 
5 See Clark, "Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the ·wm of Stephen 
Girard," 66 YALE L. J. 979 (1957). See also 48 COL. L. REV. 1241 (1948). 
6 Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E. (2d) 369 (1948), app. dismissed 335 
U.S. 875 (1948); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
7 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 
U.S. 721 (1945); Derrington v. Plummer, (5th Cir. 1956) 240 F. (2d) 922, cert. den. 
353 U.S. 924 (1957). But see Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, (D.C. -Md. 1948) 
78 F. Supp. 451; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 (1949), 
cert. den. 339 U.S. 981 (1950). 
s Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
9 E.g., Terry v. Adams, note 8 supra. But see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., note 
7 supra. 
10 HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAw 244 et seq. (1952); 57 YALE L. J. 426 (1948). See 
also Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State Action' Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957). 
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extended to include private businesses merely because they receive an oper-
ating license from the state.11 The reasons for refusing to make this exten-
sion are that the merchant's privilege to deal with whom he pleases is 
deemed more important than safeguarding civil rights which may be in-
fringed, and that the Supreme Court has no intent to make the Fourteenth 
Amendment such an omnipotent over-law.12 Thus it cannot be established 
that the state's issuance of an operating license directly resulted in the in-
fringement of defendant's constitutional right to be free from state discrim-
ination. The state did not expressly authorize discrimination and the private 
restaurant which practiced discrimination will not be considered a state 
instrumentality. 
Still it is clear that a state's power to protect property interests must be 
exercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
While a criminal trespass statute generally does not on its face disclose an 
arbitrary classification, conviction for -the offense of trespass on private 
property after notice may result in a constitutional violation. This would 
depend upon whether an individual has the consti~utionally protected right 
to be free from criminal penalties imposed by a state in recognition of a 
property owner's privilege to exclude persons because of their race. Policy 
considerations favor protecting the landowner's possessory rights, and since 
a landowner may desire to exclude individuals from entering for innumer-
able reaso~s other than racial discrimination, convictions under trespass 
statutes are generally considered valid police power measures.14 When a 
person is labeled a trespasser solely because of his color, is ejected by a 
police officer and has criminal proceedings initiated against him, latent 
arbitrary discriminations included within the statute become operative. 
Moreover, enforcement of criminal sanctions does constitute state action in 
fact. That this enforcement results in a denial of the defendants' right to 
be free from state discrimination can be argued by reference to the inter-
vention doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer:15 a state court may not sanction pro-
ceedings which aid the enforcement of private discrimination when, but for 
the judicial intervention, the private discrimination would not be as suc-
cessfully effectuated.16 It is true, however, that the defendants had no right 
11 Civil Rights Cases, note 3 supra. Accord, Terrel Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 
(Tex. App. 1944) 182 S.W. (2d) 824. See Justice Harlan's dissent in Civil Rights Cases, 
note 3 supra, at 41. 
12 See 44 CALIF. L. REv. 718 (1956). 
13 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 22 (1948). Cf. American Fed. of Labor v. Swing, 
312 U.S. 321 (1941). 
14 Hall v. Commonwealth, note 6 supra; HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAw 370 et seq. 
0%~ -
15 Note 13 supra, holding unconstitutional judicial enforcement of a restrictive 
covenant which deprived a covenantor's purchaser of property rights. See also Barrows 
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
16 Accord: Rice v. Sioux City Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. (2d) 110 (1953), 
cert. dismissed 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (dictum); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W. 
1958] RECENT DECISIONS 125 
to be on another's land without consent,17 and it seems unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would be ready to find imposition by the state court of a 
moderate statutory fine or jail sentence a sufficient impairment of rights to 
require reversal of the conviction in the principal case.18 The state's free-
dom of action in protecting peaceful possession of private property would 
probably be said to outweigh a trespasser's right not to have the state en-
force private discriminations. Only when this means of protecting property 
interests impairs a preferred fundamental right such as freedom of speech, 
press or religion in a context of great public interest does the Court seem 
inclined to declare the conviction unconstitutional.19 The present state of 
the law not only recognizes that "a man's home is his castle," but allows 
the state to police his gate and coercively enforce his racial discriminations. 
Melvyn I. Mozinski, S.Ed. 
(2d) 491 (1956) (dictum); Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E. (2d) 228 (1955), 
cert. den. 349 U.S. 947 (1955) (gift over if legatee married outside Hebrew faith); Black 
v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), note, 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 871 (1957). See also 44 
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 718 (1956). 
17 The principal case is in this respect distinguishable from Shelley v. Kraemer, note 
13 supra, as the Negroes in that case had purchased the property rights they asserted. 
18 That the discrimination was defined initially by a private person will also be 
significant, though not conclusive, in upholding the constitutionality of the conviction. 
See Shelley v. Kraemer, note 13 supra, at 20; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City 
Trusts of the City of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). A statute which expressly author-
ized this discrimination would be invalid. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); 
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). If this discrimination was the result of a state 
agent's discretion it would be unconstitutional. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886). 
10 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), note, 44 MICH. L. REv. 848 (1946), comment, 
45 MicH. L. R.Ev. 733 (1947), holding unconstitutional the state's attempt to impose 
criminal punishment on a Jehovah's Witness for distributing religious literature in a 
company town. 
